Incumbency and the transformation towards low carbon heating in the UK – Implications for policy

This is the final version of the article. Available from UKERC via the link in this record.This briefing paper summarises the key policy implications from the last of three working papers published by the Heat Incumbency Transitions Team. This research has investigated the role and behaviour of heat market ‘incumbents’ in relation to the decarbonisation of heat.UKERC is funded by The Research Councils Energy programme

A transformation to sustainable heating in the UK: risks and opportunities for UK heat sector businesses

This is the final version of the article. Available from UKERC via the link in this record.This is working paper 2/3 from the Heat, Incumbency and Transformations (HIT) project.This working paper considers the risks and opportunities posed to UK heat sector businesses by a potential transformation towards a low-carbon heat system in the UK. It is an output from the Heat, Incumbency and Transformations (HIT) project which is part of the UK Energy Research Centre programme. The HIT project is investigating the idea of incumbency, considering what the term means, how it is present in the UK’s heat sector and what the implications of incumbency are for the UK’s potential transformation from a high carbon heat system to a low-carbon heat system. The previous working paper developed a working definition of incumbency (Lowes et al., 2017). This working paper forms the second phase of the project, exploring who the incumbents are in the UK heat system and the implications of the potential transformation for incumbents.UKERC is funded by The Research Councils UK Energy Programme

Unlocking Local Energy Markets

This is the final version. Freely available from University of Exeter Energy Policy Group via the link in this recordEuropean Regional Development FundCentric

Incumbency in the UK heat sector and implications for the transformation towards low-carbon heating

This is the final version of the article. Available from UKERC via the link in this record.This is working paper 3/3 from the Heat, Incumbency and Transformations (HIT) project.This paper forms the last of three working papers published by the Heat, Incumbency and Transformations (HIT) team. The project investigated issues surrounding the decarbonisation of heating, which is increasingly seen as a priority by energy policy makers. It considers the move towards low carbon heating from the perspective of incumbency, a topic which has received only limited focus. Prior research has suggested that incumbent businesses can have both positive and negative influences on decarbonisation. There are examples of large companies investing in low carbon energy and driving change but there are also examples of incumbents trying to resist change therefore slowing or blocking decarbonisation. This paper focuses on what the policy implications of incumbency in the UK heat sector are for the decarbonisation of UK heat. The paper reports on a large number of interviews with experts working across the UK heat sector. This evidence is further built on using grey sources of literature and data.UKERC is funded by The Research Councils UK Energy Programme

Barriers to Independent Aggregators in Europe

This is the final version. Freely available from University of Exeter Energy Policy Group via the link in this recordVarious studies and consultations have been undertaken in recent years which examine the benefits that independent aggregators can bring to the European electricity markets. Independent aggregators can provide an important route to market for demand side response providers and small-scale generators, by bringing together providers who would be too small to participate in the markets individually. In addition, aggregators have detailed knowledge of these markets which many small providers might lack. Aggregation can also increase the reliability of DSR by bringing together resources from across different industries and geographies. However, at present there is no coordinated approach across Europe for the inclusion of independent aggregators into these markets. There is therefore a united view in industry bodies that further development and a coordinated approach to the aggregator role is necessary to enable their full inclusion.European Regional Development FundCentric

Auctions for the support of renewable energy in the UK: updated results and lessons learnt

This is the final version. Available from AURES II via the link in this recordBackground to this study. This report serves to restate and update the findings of AURES report D4.1-UK published in March 2016 (Fitch-Roy and Woodman 2016)1 . While the fundamental design of the UK auctions system remains largely unchanged, substantial shifts in the policy context and the additional experience and data from two further auction processes (one completed, another in progress at the time of writing) warrant an updated evaluation and report. The UK has been a frontrunner in the use of RES auctions. From early experiences with the Non Fossil-Fuel Obligation (NFFO) auctions in the 1990s to the current auction system, first announced in 2011, the use of competitive allocation mechanisms has been central to the UK’s approach to supporting new renewable electricity generation projects. However, the use and design of renewable auctions remain a source of policy debate and discussion in the UK. For example, the potential for a combination of auction dynamics and the application of a cap on the volume of ‘fuelled’ renewable technologies led to higher than necessary support costs being awarded to some projects has been the subject of an enquiry by the national audit office (NAO 2018). This remainder of this report adopts the following structure: Section 2 provides an updated overview of the UK electricity sector Section 3 outlines the key features of the UK RES auction system, including recent rule changes Section 4 updates our earlier evaluation of the programme in light of recent auctions Section 5 concludesEuropean Commissio

Policy and regulatory barriers to local energy markets in Great Britain

EPG Working Paper: EPG 1801The requirement to decarbonise the GB electricity system, alongside the falling costs of renewable technologies and developments in IT capabilities, provides GB with an opportunity for systemic change in the way that electricity is produced and sold, with the potential to enable flexibility markets at the local level given the correct regulatory conditions. The report highlights a range of regulatory and policy barriers to the Local Energy Market (LEM) approach

Defining incumbency: considering the UK heat sector

This is the final version of the article. Available from UKERC via the link in this record.This is working paper 1/3 from the Heat, Incumbency and Transformations (HIT) project.Incumbency is frequently considered as a barrier to the transformation of unsustainable socio-technical systems such as energy systems. However, despite wide use of the term, ‘incumbency’ has never been fully or adequately defined within the sustainable transitions literature. This working paper considers the use and meaning of the term incumbency in relation to sustainable transformations, specifically in relation to the UK’s heat system. It takes ideas of incumbency from other disciplines including economics, politics and innovation. Synthesising these literatures, the paper proposes a number of characteristics of incumbency. Finally we propose a definition of incumbency in relation to sustainability transformations, which suggests that incumbents are actors already present in a specific socio-technical system, who are likely to be involved with unsustainable practices, and who possess the capacity to affect system change.UKERC is funded by The Research Councils UK Energy Programme

Policy instrument supply and demand: how the renewable electricity auction took over the world

This is the final version. Available on open access from Cogitatio Press via the DOI in this recordThe selection and design of renewable electricity support instruments is an important part of EU energy policy and central to the governance of the Energy Union. In 2014, the European Commission published updated guidelines for state aid that effectively mandate the EU-wide implementation of auctions for allocating revenue support to commercial scale renewable electricity generation. This article argues that the RES auction’s rapid ascent towards dominance is explained by a coincidence of an activist interpretation of EU state aid law creating demand for knowledge about the instrument and the emergence of a ready source of supply from a burgeoning community of a RES auction specialists and experts. Knowledge gained through EU-wide implementation of auctions further adds to supply of auctions expertise among the community. The implications of positive feedback between instrument demand and the growing supply of knowledge about an instrument reinforces the importance of critical engagement between policymakers and policy experts.This research was supported by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) [1402887] and the AURES and AURES II projects funded by the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 programme [646172] and [817619

European Renewable Energy Governance under the Hammer: Interrogating the Rise and Rise of the RES Auction

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from UACES via the link in this recordAs a renewable energy pioneer, the EU is a laboratory for policy instrument evolution and innovation. Following many years of debate about the relative merit of feed-in tariffs and tradable green certificates for promoting renewable electricity expansion in Europe, there is a new instrument in town. The renewable energy support (RES) auction has rapidly become the instrument of choice, de facto mandated by the European Commission under state-aid law. RES auctions are now the main instrument in many European countries. A common explanation for the adoption of RES auctions by EU member states is that the Commission requires their implementation under state-aid law, and member states acquiesced. This paper casts a critical eye over this “coercive Commission” explanation by constructing an account of the transition to auctions in Germany and Spain, each titans of EU renewable energy. By focussing on the necessary conditions for the coercive Commission argument – institutional compatibility and supportive domestic interest constituencies – we provide a qualified account of Commission action in this area and show a more dynamic and strategic approach to RES policy instrument harmonisation. We conclude by suggesting that future research may usefully examine the implications of a pan-European system of centrally coordinated auctions for the long-term future in of RES policy in the EU.European Commissio